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Debates about captive supplies have been ongoing for more than a decade.  This 
study investigates the effects captive supplies have on the beef farm-to-wholesale 
marketing margin.  A relative price spread (RPS) model is used to estimate beef farm-to-
wholesale marketing margins.  Estimates indicate that forward contracts and marketing 
agreements have a small positive relationship with margins that is marginally significant.  
Packer fed cattle may or may not be related to margins to depending upon model 
specification. 
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The debate regarding the impact of forward contracting and marketing agreements 
between cattle feeders and beef processors as well as packer-owned cattle feeding has 
persisted for more than a decade.  Much of the debate has centered around captive 
supplies being negatively correlated with short-run fed cattle transaction prices.
1  This 
empirical result has been confirmed by several studies (e.g., Ward, Koontz, and 
Schroeder; Schroeder et al.; Azzam and Schroeter).  Numerous policies have been 
proposed at the national level to limit or eliminate various ways beef packers procure 
slaughter cattle.  Noteworthy among these was the Johnson Amendment proposed in the 
2002 Farm Bill that would have eliminated beef packer ownership and control (see 
Hayenga for a discussion of how Agricultural Economists engaged in debate of this 
amendment). 
  One concern regarding captive supply is how it is related to the farm-to-wholesale 
margin.  The objective of this research is to determine the relationship between the farm-
to-wholesale margin and packer-owned cattle feeding and cattle procured by packers 
using agreements and contracts.  This is the first study to estimate how monthly packer 
margins are related to packer feeding and marketing agreements and contracts.  Two 
different possible relationships could exist.  If use of packer feeding and/or marketing 
agreements increases packer efficiency, then we would expect to find a negative 
relationship between the farm-to-wholesale margin and these purchasing methods.  
                                                 
1 Captive supplies are defined by USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA) as livestock that is 1) owned or fed by a packer, 2) procured by a packer through a contract or 
marketing agreement, or 3) otherwise committed to a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter.   2
Alternatively, if these procurement methods enable packers to reduce prices they pay for 
cash market fed cattle, then we would expect a positive relationship.  Real farm-to-
wholesale margins have had a very small increase between 1988 and 1996, but have since 
had little trend (Figure 1).  However, monthly margins vary a lot over time ranging 
between $3-$13/cwt.  Figure 2 illustrates the monthly pattern over time in packer feeding 
of cattle and in marketing agreements and contracts for the largest 15 U.S. beef packers.  
Packer-owned fed cattle have represented a small and relatively stable percentage of 
slaughter over time averaging about 3-4%.  Whereas, marketing agreement and contract 
cattle purchases have trended upward since the early 1990’s typically representing 15-
20% of slaughter by the late 1990’s. 
 
Previous Literature 
The theoretical framework for farm-to-retail margins is grounded in work by 
Gardner in 1975.  His model demonstrated the impacts of factor markets on determining 
the price spread.  Most empirical work since then has been based upon his model 
specification.  Brorsen, et al. (1985), built upon the marketing models by Gardner to 
determine the effect of changes in output risk using the U.S. wheat market.  They 
demonstrated that increased price variability increases marketing margins in the wheat 
industry. 
Wohlgenant and Mullen (1987) compared a markup-pricing spread model to a 
relative price spread (RPS) model.  The difference between these two models is the 
markup-pricing model assumes a fixed relationship spread.  Using annual beef margin 
data, they concluded the RPS model is preferred to the markup-pricing model.  Numerous   3
studies have since used the RPS model including Faminow and Laubscher in the South 
Africa maize market; Lyon and Thompson in fluid milk markets; and Brester and Musick 
and Capps, Byrne and Williams in lamb markets. 
Recent work by Marsh and Brester (1999) studied the effect of technological 
change on beef and pork marketing margins and real slaughter cattle and hog prices.  
Labor productivity, percentage of livestock marketed by firms, and average dressed 
weights were used as proxies for technological progress.  They found technological 
progress in the meat-packing sector has been a significant contributor to declining real 
beef and pork farm-to-wholesale marketing margins.  Technological progress in the 
packer industry had a positive effect on real cattle and hog prices.   
Several studies have also been conducted of various fed cattle marketing 
techniques and prices.  Ward, et al. (1998) evaluated the impacts of captive supplies on 
fed cattle transaction prices.  Three models were employed to determine how cash prices 
influence captive supply deliveries (model 1), the impact captive supply inventories have 
on prices (model 2), and the effect captive supply have on the difference between cash 
prices and captive supply prices (model 3).  They concluded that cash price and captive 
supply deliveries had a small negative relationship (model 1).  The second model 
produced mixed results, but found captive supplies had no significant effect on cash 
prices.  The third model found that forward contract prices averaged a lower price than 
cash prices, while marketing agreements received a premium over cash prices.  The third 
model also found cattle prices that were packer-fed were not significantly different than 
cash cattle prices.   4
Schroeder, et al. (1993) studied the impacts of forward contracting on cash market 
prices in the southwest Kansas marketing region.  In the first model estimated, they used 
the sum of contract shipments across four firms in the region as one variable.  In the 
second model, contract shipments were separated by individual firm.  They found captive 
supply deliveries were associated with $0.15/cwt to $0.31/cwt reduced cash fed cattle 
transaction price. 
Schroeter and Azzam utilized transactions data on fed cattle sales from the Texas 
Panhandle to determine the relationship between fed cattle prices and captive supply.  
Similar to the other studies, they found a small negative relationship between weekly fed 
cattle prices and captive supply.  They went further to evaluate possible reasons for this 
negative relationship and concluded that one possible reason could be that cattle feeder 
strategic timing of cattle deliveries under marketing agreements vs. cash market trade 
could contribute to this observed inverse relationship between cash market prices and 
captive supply shipments. 
 
Farm-To-Wholesale Beef Marketing Margin Model 
This study employs a modified version of the RPS model developed by 
Wohlgenant and Mullen to estimate determinants of beef marketing margins.  The RPS 
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Where M is the farm-to-wholesale price spread between farm-level, slaughter beef prices 
and wholesale price of beef plus beef by-products ($/cwt), P is the wholesale price of   5
beef ($/cwt), Q is per capita quantity of beef produced (lbs. per person), IMC is an index 
of food marketing costs, RISK represents the output price risk faced by packers, POF is 
the percentage of fed cattle slaughter owned by packers, PFCMA is the percentage of fed 
cattle acquisitions packers procure through forward contracts and marketing agreements, 
TECH represents technological change over time in beef packing, CARCASS represents 
the average carcass weight ($/cwt), and Di (i=1,2,…12) are monthly dummy variables.  
See table 1 for specific variable definitions. 
  Previous studies provide justification for the expected signs for many variables in 
equation (1).  As wholesale prices or input costs increases this would be expected to lead 
to an increases in the price spread; hence, the expected signs of α1, α2, and α3 are positive 
(Brester and Musick).  The coefficient on the risk variable should also be positive.  If 
packers are risk averse or if variability increases costs, then an increase in price risk 
would be expected to increase margins (Brorsen, et al.)  The expected sign on technology 
should be negative (Marsh and Brester).  If a slaughter plant produces output more 
efficiently through technology adoption, then farm-to-wholesale margins will decrease.   
Packer fed cattle slaughter and marketing agreements could have coefficients with 
either positive or negative signs depending upon how they might influence the margin.  
The expected sign of α5 and α6 will be negative if these procurement methods increase 
packer efficiency.  For example, if these procurement methods help ensure packing plant 
utilization, then increasing their use would be expected to reduce marketing margins over 
time.  However, if packers were able to use these procurement methods to reduce prices 
they pay for cash market cattle through reducing competition in the cash market, then the 
signs of α5 and α6 might be positive (Kinnucan and Nelson).  The expected sign on the   6
carcass variable should be negative.  As carcass weights increase, packers would be 
expected to produce more output per hour of operation (up until the point where 




  Monthly data from January 1988 to December 1998 were employed in this study.  
Farm-level beef prices ($/cwt) are reported by the Agricultural Marketing Services and 
obtained from the Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC).  Wholesale beef 
prices (i.e., average of Choice and Select boxed beef ($/cwt)) and by-product prices 
($/cwt) were also obtained from the LMIC.  Price indexes of food marketing costs were 
acquired from the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS).  The index measures 
changes in costs (i.e., employee earnings, prices of supplies used in processing, etc.) that 
are associated with transforming raw inputs into foods that are purchasable for at-home 
consumption.  
Technology development in beef packing was measured using the proxy Indexes 
of Output per Hour for meat packing plant workers from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (USBLS).  The technology data were only available on an annual basis.  
Therefore, monthly data were obtained by linear extrapolation.  The coefficient of 
variation for 12-month rolling averages of wholesale beef prices used a relative measure 
of price risk in the farm-to-wholesale margin equation.  Consequently, data for 1987 were 
used in determining the risk variable for the first year of the sample.  Quantity was 
calculated by dividing total beef production by civilian population. Total beef production   7
data (in millions of pounds) for this study was reported by LMIC.  Population for the 
United States was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Each monetary variable is 
deflated by the Consumer Price Index (1982-84=100) reported by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
  Captive Supply data were obtained from Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA).  Packer fed cattle that are owned and acquired 
through forward contracts and marketing agreements are reported as a percentage of the 
15-largest beef packer slaughter.  These data were only available from 1988-1998, thus 
limiting the time period selected for analysis.  
  Table 1 contains summary statistics of data used to estimate the margin model.  
The margin averaged $6.03/cwt with a standard deviation of $1.70/cwt. 
 
Results  
  The model presented in (1) might possess simultaneity in the wholesale price 
variable.  To determine whether it suffers from this bias, the Hausman test for 
contemporaneous correlation between the error term and the wholesale price of beef was 
employed (Pindyck and Rubinfeld).  This test involved running two Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regressions.  In the first regression, wholesale price of beef was regressed 
on the remaining exogenous variables and wholesale price of pork and retail prices of 
pork and chicken (instrument variables).  The second regression consisted of estimating 
the farm-to-wholesale model including the residuals from the first regression as a 
regressor.  The test statistic for the residual of wholesale beef prices was 0.42, which is   8
smaller than the critical student-t value of 1.98 at the 5% level.  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis was not rejected and wholesale beef prices were considered exogenous. 
The margin model was initially estimated using ordinary least squares regression.  
Results indicated the presence of residual autocorrelation.  Therefore, the Yule-Walker 
procedure in SAS was used to correct for first-order autocorrelation.  Table 2 presents the 
autocorrelation-corrected regression results (model 1).  The model explained 50.17% of 
the variability in the farm-to-wholesale margin.  Although theory suggests the model 
should be estimated without an intercept term included in the model (Wohlgenant and 
Mullen), one was implicitly included here by including all 12 monthly dummy variables 
in the model.  The monthly dummy variables were included to account for seasonality. 
Several of the theorized factors that are expected to impact farm-to-wholesale 
margins were not statistically significant.  For example, during this time period, 
wholesale price was not associated with the margin.  This suggests beef packer margins 
are invariant to the boxed beef price level over time.  This contrasts what Wholgenant 
and Mullen found using annual data, but is consistent with other studies (e.g., Brester and 
Musick; Kinnucan and Nelson).  Similarly, the wholesale price times quantity variable is 
not different from zero.
 2  
The coefficient on TECH is statistically significant at the 5% level.  A one percent 
increase in the output per employee hour index reduces the farm-to-wholesale margin by 
4.6%.  This result is consistent, though larger in magnitude, with Brester and Marsh who 
found an elasticity of -1.85% in annual beef farm-to-wholesale margins.  From the late 
1980s through the early 1990s, meat-packing plant output per worker declined by about 
                                                 
2  To determine whether lack of significance of particular variables was caused by collinearity, equation (1) 
was also estimated excluding quantity times price and excluding wholesale price separately.  However, in 
all cases the model gave qualitatively identical conclusions.   9
3% and then jumped by about 6% by 1993.  Since, 1993 this index has declined by about 
2-3%.  This variability in technology has had a noticeable impact on the marketing 
margin.  Any changes like adoption of HACCP or other food safety protocols that affect 
labor productivity, at least in the short run until the technology makes compliance more 
efficient, affect the marketing margin.   
Packer ownership of cattle had no statistically significant impact on margins.  
This is consistent with previous work that has found no impact of packer fed cattle on fed 
cattle prices (Ward, et al.).  This result suggests that packer ownership of fed cattle does 
not increase beef packer market power to the extent that it is revealed in larger margins as 
supporters of banning packer ownership contend.   
Forward contracting and marketing agreement cattle have a positive coefficient, 
although it is only marginally significant (at the 0.15 level).  This suggests that packers 
might increase the farm-to-wholesale margin when contract and marketing agreement 
cattle increase.  However, the elasticity indicates that a ten percent increase in the 
percentage of cattle procured under marketing agreements (e.g., increasing from 25% to 
27.5% of cattle marketings) is associated with only a 1.8% increase in the margin (e.g., 
increase from $6/cwt carcass weight to $6.11/cwt), a very small economic impact.  
Previous studies have found that marketing agreement and contract cattle deliveries are 
associated with a small decline in fed cattle prices (e.g., Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder; 
Schroeder et al.; Azzam and Schroeter).  Our results add to our understanding of this 
relationship in that the small reduction in fed cattle price associated with higher contract 
and marketing agreement deliveries does not appear to be fully passed on in the form of 
lower wholesale beef prices.  However, it is important to keep in mind that this   10
coefficient is only marginally statistically significant suggesting we have a relatively low 
level of confidence in this claim.  Other variables that were statistically significant in 
some previous studies (i.e., risk, marketing costs, and carcass weight) were not 
significant. 
The dummy variables in equation (1) were included to account for seasonality; 
however, all the variables were insignificant.  Therefore, the farm-to-wholesale beef 
marketing margin model was re-estimated without the monthly dummy variables.  Table 
2 presents the re-estimated autocorrelation-corrected regression results (model 2).  Under 
this revised model specification, wholesale price, quantity, forward contracting and 
marketing agreement cattle, and technology were all significant at the 5% level and 
packer fed cattle slaughter was significant at the 10% level.  Apparently, the monthly 
dummy variables were related to seasonal variation in the independent variables.  
Interestingly, the elasticities of packer fed slaughter and contracts and marketing 
agreements were the same at 0.19.  This suggests that a 10% increase in each of these 
procurement methods increases farm-to-wholesale margin by 1.9% (a very small 
economic amount). 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
  Farm-to-wholesale marketing margins in the beef industry were analyzed in this 
study.  No previous empirical work has used monthly data on captive supply published 
by GIPSA to determine its impact on farm-to-wholesale marketing margins.  The 
objective of this study was to determine if captive supplies had any effect on beef farm-
to-wholesale marketing margin.  The RPS model was used to allow for simultaneous   11
changes in supply and demand and measured the impacts on a few key factors of price 
margins in the beef industry.  These factors include wholesale prices, wholesale price 
times quantity of beef produced, marketing costs, risk, technology, packer-owned fed 
cattle, acquisitions packers use through forward contracts and marketing agreements, 
carcass weight, and seasonality.   
Conclusions from this study show acquisitions made by packers through forward 
contracts and marketing agreements had a small positive relationship with margins that 
were marginally statistically significantly different from zero (model 1) and statistically 
significant at the 5% level (model 2) .  This indicates that packer margins widen by a 
small amount when packer-owned fed cattle (model 2) and marketing agreement and 
contract cattle (model 1) deliveries increase.  This suggests that the small negative 
relationships found in previous studies between cash fed cattle prices and captive supply 
were apparently not all passed on to the wholesale market.  However, fed cattle that are 
owned by packers had no significant relationship to margins (model 1), while model 2 
shows that  packer-owned fed cattle is statistically significantly different from zero at the 
10% level   Important to note is that these results do not suggest causality between 
captive supplies and wholesale margins, rather, they simply demonstrate the nature of 
their correlation.  Addressing these issues is left for future research.  12
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Source: calculated from USDA data  15
Figure 2.  Monthly Slaughter Packer Fed Cattle and Marketing Agreements and Forward Contracts, 15 Largest Packers,  
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Dependent variable:  Deflated wholesale boxed 
beef price plus by-product price minus slaughter 
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a Deflated to constant dollars 1982-84=100   17
Table 2.  Parameter Estimates of Monthly Farm-to-Wholesale Beef Marketing Margins 
        Model 1                                               Model 2 
Independent   Farm-to-Wholesale  Elasticity Farm-to-Wholesale    Elasticity 
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Table 2. Continued. Parameter Estimates of Monthly Farm-to-Wholesale Beef Marketing 
Margins  
                         Model 1                                                Model 2 
Independent   Farm-to-Wholesale   Elasticity Farm-to-Wholesale    Elasticity 


























**Indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level, ρ is a first-order 
autoregressive parameter and standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 